A contemporary reevaluation of the crash has placed the majority of the blame on American Airlines Chief Pilot Cecil, the man who designed the Advanced Aircraft Manoeuvring Program was American Airlines chief pilot Cecil Ewell. The training of pilots at the airline occurred with little manufacturer oversight and Ewell’s own training had occurred decades earlier in fighter jets. Pilots were taught to use the rudder to solve a wide variety of unusual situations and problems. Pilots were trained to use rudder as the primary flight control surface for wake turbulence encounters. Simulator training reinforced rudder use as the main control mechanism for jet wash, and falsely gave pilots the belief that wake encounters would sharply blank a large commercial jet. Evidence presented to the NTSB investigation revealed Airbus Industry had warned Ewell, through emails and phone conferences that the training of pilots at American Airlines was inappropriate and wrong. The training program was left unchanged with a minor update to place less emphasis on rudder use. Airbus Industry also failed to warn American Airlines about the manoeuvring capabilities of the Airbus A300-600 especially below VA.

The FAA, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Airbus raised concerns about the AAMP training’s overemphasis on rudder use during upset recovery, suggesting revisions to the program. It was only after the accident, the AAMP was revised to reflect these concerns and to emphasise the importance of using the control column and wheel for upset recovery. The NTSB also noted that the simulator training did not present realistic wake turbulence scenarios, further contributing to the pilots’ unrealistic expectations.